Can U.S. Remain an Asian Power? – Gerald Horne

When Nixon went to China, he had no idea the consequences of rapprochement would be a rival global power. Gerald Horne on theAnalysis.news with Paul Jay.

Paul Jay

Hi, I’m Paul Jay, welcome to theAnalysis.news. Please don’t forget the donate button, the subscribe button, and the share button. And we’ll be back in just a few seconds with Gerald Horne with whom we’re going to talk about China. 

Gerald Horne

Last week was the celebration of the 100th anniversary of the Communist Party of China. The Communist Party of China, as much as Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger dearly hoped by now would no longer be the leading force or government of China, is in no way leaving the scene of history anytime soon, and the United States had better learn to deal with it. China is now very close to being or is already on par in size with the U.S. economy, and it’s predicted that within less than a decade, perhaps, to be larger than the American economy. This doesn’t bode well for a country that sees itself as the global hegemon. Now joining us to talk about China and U.S.-China relations is Gerald Horne. Gerald is a historian who holds the John J. and Rebecca Moores Chair of History and African American Studies at the University of Houston. He is the author of many books, including The Apocalypse of Settler Colonialism: The Roots of Slavery, White Supremacy and Capitalism in 17th Century North America and the Caribbean, and most recently, The Bittersweet Science: Racism, Racketeering and the Political Economy of Boxing. Thanks for joining me again, Gerald.

Gerald Horne

Thank you for inviting me.

Paul Jay

So we’ve been wanting to talk about China for a while. So the Communist Party of China has remained in power, as I said, in spite of all the hopes of the United States and Western Europe and Canada that market capitalism, combined with the state sector, would lead to “democratization” and “opening up”. And the great hope was the weakening of the Communist Party of China and that sure doesn’t seem to be happening. So what do you make of U.S. expectations from when Nixon makes that famous visit and where we are?

Gerald Horne

Well, there are many competitors for the dubious title of the most catastrophic and disastrous geostrategic decision in the history of U.S. foreign policy. As Afghanistan begins to disintegrate, you may want to point to that country where the United States over the decades has poured in trillions of dollars. And yet you see the Taliban apparently on the verge of coming back to power within months. You may want to point to Iraq, where likewise the United States has spent trillions of dollars. And yet the ultimate beneficiary of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein was the neighboring country of Iran. But I would point to U.S. policy towards China. I would point to the fact that approximately 50 years ago, Henry Kissinger went to China in order to effectuate an anti-Soviet entente with the People’s Republic of China. And the idea was that China would then ally with the United States to a certain degree, which it did with regard not only to anti-Sovietism, but with regard to waging war in Vietnam after the United states was ignominiously evicted post-1975. With regard to Japan, many forget that in the late 1980s, early 1990s, there was a kind of panic about Japan that is in some ways equivalent to the panic about China now. Go back and look at some of the movies, for example, Rising Sun with Sean Connery and Wesley Snipes, where the Japanese plutocrats not only want to take over the U.S. economy, they want the blondes too. That theme is also pursued in the movie Iron Maze with Bridget Fonda, who, of course, has a Japanese partner which stirs up anger and resentment among many of the Euro-American males.

Paul Jay

When I was a kid, I remember seeing video of American auto workers smashing the windshields of Japanese cars.

Gerald Horne

Well, sure. Of course, there was the killing of Vincent Chin, a Chinese American in the United States, who, during the “Japanic”, as we called it, was fundamentally lynched by Euro-American auto workers and Euro-American working class people. And so China in some ways carried water for U.S. imperialism during the conflict with Japan to a degree that is somewhat understandable in light of the depredations that Tokyo committed in China in the early 1940s during the Pacific War. But in any case, the payoff for China was this massive foreign direct investment not only from the United States, but its North Atlantic allies as well, which has created this juggernaut that, as you said in your remarks, bids fair to leave US imperialism sprawling in the dust as it jets ahead. And so now you see the United States trying to turn back the clock of time in history. You saw that in Mr. Biden’s jaunt to Western Europe in the last few weeks where the Group of Seven, including your own Canada, signed a statement that pointed to China as some sort of threat that needs to be reined in. But as you suggested, it may be too late for that. It’s possible that the horse has left the barn and that this runaway train of Beijing is unstoppable. And to the degree that that is the case, you would have to say that this was a spectacular misjudgment on the part, not only of the US ruling elite, but of universities like Yale, which have these programs and grand strategy which is supposed to make sure the United States remains top dog till the end of time, or the think tankers, for example. If this society were more like Japanese society, there would be a ritual where all of these members of the US ruling elite and their acolytes would bow and ritualistically commit mass suicide or at least forfeit power, because obviously they forfeited their justification for ruling insofar as they have created from their own perspective, a disaster and a catastrophe. And what’s even more remarkable is that it’s hardly discussed in polite company nowadays.

Paul Jay

Well, did they really have a choice? They had a choice on Afghanistan. They didn’t have to overthrow the Taliban. They could have gone after bin Laden forces. They had a choice on Iraq. That was a totally unnecessary invasion. And most of the people that actually knew the region said it was going to actually not achieve the results the empire wanted. Even Barack Obama opposed that war because it was stupid, not because he’s a peacenik of any kind.

 

But on China, I don’t know if they really had a choice in the sense that sooner or later they so needed that Chinese market. They needed the cheap labor. The development of American capitalism just couldn’t leave so much of the world out of its orbit. And of course, the miscalculation is they just assumed that over time there’d be an opening up and they would get their way with China. And I always thought that China for a while was a prostitute that said, “OK, you can come have our cheap labor, but on your way out on top of the dresser, you leave your technical know-how.” And so for the quick fix, the Americans got their cheap labor in the West, but the transfer of technology is such now that they’re getting more than they ever reckoned for. But it was kind of inevitable, wasn’t it? This is how capitalism works.

Gerald Horne

Well, it depends on what you mean by inevitable. I think that the complement to this China policy that we’ve just sketched is the Red Scare, whereby progressive unions and even centrist unions were weakened because they were perceived as pursuing a class analysis or class solidarity, which became inimical to the purposes of the Cold War and the Red Scare, so they had to be weakened. And the weakening of these unions was a precondition to capital being able to export all of these jobs across the Pacific.

 

So the United States did not have to weaken these unions. Just like today when there are complaints about jobs being unfilled, what management needs to do is pay workers more and you’ll see people flocking to those jobs. And so likewise, I don’t think that it was inevitable that the United States had to weaken unions, which made these unions virtually incapable of resisting these runaway shops. And so to that extent, it seems to me that there’s a certain amount of agency with regard to the managerial class, the capitalist class, the rulers of U.S. imperialism, and I’m not sure if I want to give them any slack or in any way intimate that I’m letting them off the hook as if to suggest they didn’t have a choice.

Paul Jay

Well, OK, but I guess one way or the other, they’re in a situation now where I don’t see what they do about it. China, unless there’s some very serious internal contradictions within China where the Chinese Communist Party starts to lose credibility and clout to such an extent, because I don’t doubt that China’s authoritarian and I don’t doubt they have a heavy police presence and the ability to suppress dissent is very strong. You can’t rule a country that size just like that. If you don’t have popular support to go along with that, you can’t do it just through that kind of authoritarianism. And right now the Chinese people’s lives continue to improve economically and they seem to be significantly. Obviously, the big comparison is comparing China to India. And with the kind of democratization the Americans are calling for it, boy, if I was Chinese and I’d think “well, what we’re going to head to is India and I can do without that kind of democratization.” But that kind of internal issue doesn’t seem to be happening, although magazines like Foreign Affairs are hoping. They keep talking about the middle income countries and that China’s plateauing, but so far, no sign of that. What the hell do the Americans do? They can’t give up the Chinese market and the more they antagonize China, the more they might have to face that. On the other hand, China is going to become the dominant, if not already, but really become the dominant economy and power at the very least in Asia. I don’t get where the U.S. goes with all this.

Gerald Horne

Well, I had thought during Mr. Biden’s European jaunt that we would get a hint of U.S. geostrategy in Geneva and the meeting with Mr. Putin. I had thought that that would lead to a kind of reverse Kissinger maneuver where there’d be blandishments to Moscow to woo it away from China. But apparently that’s not going to happen I think in part because as a result of the previous epic, the Cold War, there was so much anti-Moscow sentiment that has been encrusted. It’s going to be very difficult to effectuate any kind of entente with Moscow. And in any case, you see that Washington is sending contrary signals because right after the meeting with Mr. Putin, Jake Sullivan, the national security adviser suggested that there would be further sanctions against Russia. You saw this recent escapade in the Black Sea off the coast of Crimea, which Moscow seized from Ukraine in 2014, which led to a freeze in relations between the United States and the North Atlantic bloc generally. You saw this British vessel, in conjunction with U.S. spy planes that were probing and testing Russian defenses, which obviously angered Mr. Putin. His foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, has just suggested the other day that these powers basically will get clocked in the nose. I think that that’s a quote, if I’m not mistaken. And so it’s difficult to see how Washington is going to woo Russia, which might be a possible way out. But instead, you see that all of these maneuvers have left Moscow actually in a rather positive position. I don’t mean its relationships with the European Union, even though Germany and France have talked about talks with Putin in light of Biden’s talks, which were thwarted by the former Soviet republics of the Baltics, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, not to mention Poland.

 

But it’s also the fact that Russia has very good relations with India. As a matter of fact, post-1947 Indian independence, it wouldn’t be unfair to suggest that Russia has been the closest ally New Delhi over the decades, and as noted, the relations with China right now are as close as lips and teeth, as might be said in Beijing. So all of this presents a very daunting foreign policy environment for U.S. policymakers. And once again, as used to be said during the Cold War, it would be helpful if these US foreign policy advisers and strategists would study chess. They seem to see foreign policy as a game of checkers. They don’t seem to be able to see one step ahead. And so therefore, they’re left with this very disadvantageous political climate. And I’m afraid to say that Canada, for whatever reason, is stumbling along behind Uncle Sam, apparently oblivious to these wider currents that I’m sketching.

Paul Jay

Canadians just are more concerned about American trade than anything else, I suppose. But isn’t most of this Biden positioning about domestic politics? They don’t want to be accused of being weak on Russia or weak on China. The whole thing is kind of crazy to my mind. In this sense, what exactly are they really worried about? Because they keep talking about Chinese aggression. Where is it? I don’t get it. Where is the Chinese aggression? I don’t know of a single example of what you could call Chinese aggression. With Russia, the one thing I agree with Henry Kissinger on is that I don’t think Crimea showed a pattern. It was quite an exceptional circumstance. But even with Russia, you don’t really see any examples of Russian aggression. And I don’t know what to make of all this cyber stuff. If it’s true, I’m sure it’s going in both directions. But the real threat, I guess, to the U.S. is not military. In a sense, it’s not geopolitical in terms of aggression. It’s just that China is just going to be the most powerful economy in Asia and the Americans are going to have a damn hard time competing with it.

Gerald Horne

Well, that’s obvious. That’s the point. The United States is nostalgic for the unipolar moment following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, where the United States was portrayed as the “uberpower,” the indispensable power. And obviously that was frittered away in the sands of Iraq, if not in Afghanistan and so now there’s the pivot to Asia, the pivot to China, but it’s difficult to see how that’s going to work out. But in any case, I think the point from Washington’s posture is that it’s very important to the national ego of the United States to be and be perceived as the top dog on planet Earth. And that seems to be what the situation is. And obviously, there’s also the situation of maintaining the hegemony of the dollar because the rise of China portends perhaps that the dollar will then begin to retreat as well. The United States gets many benefits from having the dollar be this primary currency. And there’s not only the threat from the Chinese renminbi, but also the digital renminbi, not to mention the euro itself. And so if that takes place, then to put it simplistically, perhaps crudely, using the old printing press to help to give out tax cuts to the one percent and all the rest will become much more problematic. And not to mention the fact that the United States already is in a quandary, since it has to borrow on a regular basis from the People’s Bank of China in order to keep the basic functions of government running. And with China increasingly assuming the driver’s seat, that too, could be problematic, which would lead either to raising of taxes, which many in this country see as the mark of the devil, or more likely, cutting programs and education and health care, which would be disastrous and catastrophic for the working class and for the poor in the first place. So the United States is faced with many distasteful options and alternatives. But once again, I don’t feel that it had to work out this way. This has been a step by step masterclass in how to retreat as a major power.

Paul Jay

I know it’s a little simplistic sounding, but it’s hard to understand for me at least, U.S. policy towards China other than the rationale that supports the military industrial complex in the United States. I don’t get what else it is because if it’s going to be straight economic competition that gets antagonistic, a market of more than a billion people is a hell of a lot bigger than a market of 300 million. And yeah, the 300 million plus in the US spend more than the billion do now, but that’s going to change. The lack of access to that market and the strength of the Chinese in Asia, if it gets increasingly antagonistic, cannot be good for the commercial concerns of the United States except the arms manufacturers. It’s hard to justify, I keep using this example because I think it’s so extraordinary, these Ford class aircraft carriers that are going to be 10 to 14 billion dollars each, and they’re buying a dozen of them. You don’t justify that without an enemy of the scale of a China. Frankly, even Russia’s a mid-level power. You can dress it up all you like, but it’s not a global superpower. Without a China, how do you justify that level of military expenditure? It makes so much more sense to keep to the original plan, keep working with China, try to integrate China more and more into global capitalism, and hope for the best. That’s not where it’s going.

Gerald Horne

Well, speaking of the military industrial complex, that brings us to a major component of that enterprise. Speaking of Boeing, the airplane manufacturer, which not only gets subsidies from the Pentagon, but also, as you know, has a thriving civilian market as well. You saw that United Airlines just bought a number of Boeing planes. And the hysteria that is gripping the North Atlantic powers is no better illustrated by the fact that Boeing and its major competitor, which is Airbus of Western Europe, have decided to kiss and make up, bury the hatchet because they’re justifiably concerned as they look over their left shoulder with the rise of Comac, which is the Chinese manufacturer of aircraft, which has a built in market of one quarter of humanity, which is building something equivalent to what Japan was attempting in the 1930s and the 1940s. Speaking of a so-called co-prosperity sphere, that is to say, a number of countries that are basically integrated into the Chinese market and the Chinese sphere of influence, which would include a good deal of Asia, a good deal of Latin America, a good deal of Africa, and where does that leave Boeing and Airbus? And so I think that it’s that kind of scenario is what’s keeping Washington policymakers up at night, giving them a bout of insomnia. And from their point of view, there is a reason for them to be concerned, if not frightened.

Paul Jay

It seems to me that when you think about China and the United States, the overriding issue here for me, because it’s the overriding issue about everything right now, is climate. With regard to the long term prospects of U.S. power and global hegemony and the rise of China and all the rest, if the climate crisis isn’t addressed and addressed quickly I have no idea where all this ends up. I mean, we’re already feeling it, but a cataclysmic situation may be upon us perhaps in just 30 or 40 years for much of the world, at any rate, which includes much of China for that matter, and certainly much of the United States. So the big question for me, and this is something I’m going to pursue more with others who know about China, is just how serious China is about addressing climate. They’ve said they’re going to hit net zero by 2060, whatever net zero really means, but let’s hope for the best that that actually means zero. And because the United States has no real central planning and China does, authoritarian or not, if the Chinese government actually is serious about climate through central planning and for whatever it’s worth, even authoritarianism, they actually might be able to hit those targets. Right now, I don’t see that the US is at all even serious about it, including the Biden administration. And even if they got serious, they’d be up against such formidable opposition from the fossil fuel industry and other sectors of the economy and the population, for that matter, that it may be that China actually has and maybe will lead the way on this. And I wonder what kind of pressure that puts on the U.S., even though Biden is trying to dress it up like they’re pressuring China to deal with climate, but it actually may turn the other way around.

Gerald Horne

Well, raising that question raises another thicket that Washington has to be concerned about. If you look at solar energy, for example, it’s obvious that China is the leader. It’s in the passing lane. If you look at battery technology, which oftentimes is dependent upon lithium, where the Andean countries like Bolivia have a certain amount of influence in terms of producing this element. China has better relations with the Andean countries than the United States does, not least since the United States has been accused credibly of helping to make sure that Evo Morales, the former president, could not serve another term. And even if you look at U.S. champions like Tesla of Elon Musk, it has a significant manufacturing facility in China. As you’ve already suggested, that comes with a price, that is to see through either fair means or foul. There’s a technology transfer from Tesla to Chinese competitors like NIO, for example, and that does not mean score one for the United States of America, not to mention the fact that companies like General Motors of Michigan also are heavily invested in China, as well as putting a lot of emphasis going forward in this decade on electric vehicles. But once again, it seems to me that the price of the ticket of GM facilities in China will be technology transfer by means fair or foul.

 

And what’s even more striking is that this competition with China in some ways is compelling the United States to act more like China. What I mean is if you look at this multi-billion dollar bill that just passed on a bipartisan basis in Washington, very rare, very unusual, was initially called the Endless Frontiers bill, which was a very telling name for a piece of legislation. But it’s basically a bill that’s going to help to transfer our tax dollars to various industries, particularly the chip manufacturing industry, where right now Taiwan Semiconductor, one hundred and ten miles from the Chinese mainland, now has a stranglehold, despite the present conflicted relations between Taiwan and the People’s Republic. I’m not sure if that conflict will last indefinitely, not least because there have already been strong hints from Beijing that it will not last indefinitely and that Mr. Xi Jinping sees as part of his legacy what he would consider to be the reunification of China. And so, therefore, you’re going to see the United States try to pump more tax dollars into a homegrown competitor. That’s going to be very difficult. And indeed, Taiwan Semiconductor is building a facility in Arizona. And I’m not sure what would happen to that facility if there is a change in the political climate between the People’s Republic and Taiwan. So the United States, despite this alleged disdain for planning, is planning because it’s trying to keep up with China. And I think for the progressive movement, what we need to think about is what are the other ways that China will be influencing the United States of America so that we can get ahead of the game and anticipate their next move, speaking of Washington’s next move.

Paul Jay

I actually think that bill and that kind of rhetoric is preferable, at any rate, to putting more money into military expansion. And with all the rhetoric about China as the threat and aggressor, the more they use the word competition as opposed to adversary, I’m saying they being the Biden administration and Congress, I think the better it is. They’re two essentially capitalist countries. They’re going to compete. That’s a given. But it’s better they compete economically than try to compete militarily, although it looks like they’re going to do both. But at least the rhetoric around that bill is less aggressive than straightforward military expenditure.

Gerald Horne

Well, to a degree, yes. But keep in mind as well that the latest revelation has emerged that Tokyo has determined that it wants its military, which is not a negligible factor, despite the Japanese so-called peace constitution, to become involved in the so-called defense of Taiwan in league and in conjunction with the United States of America. This adds to the developing so-called Quad, speaking of the United States, Japan, Australia and India, which are developing a kind of anti-China alliance. And in that context, note that India has just sent 50,000 more troops to the border with China, which does not bode well. But once again, we’ve been speaking about how the United States has made certain blunders when you could say the same thing about the People’s Republic of China. Recall that it was in 1962 when the world’s attention was fixed on the so-called Cuban missile crisis, that is to say, Moscow putting these missiles in Cuba and engaged in a stare down with Washington over whether or not they would be removed. And of course, they were removed and the United States missiles were removed from Turkey, but that was kept quiet so the United States could look better. It was at that precise moment that China attacked India, which apparently broke the heart of Prime Minister Nehru, the founding father of modern India. I mentioned a moment ago how after the United States was evicted from Vietnam, it was China that waged war in Vietnam and emerged with a bloody nose. And so you have the spectacle of these two so-called communist powers not having ideal relations. And I think to a certain extent, you can lay that at the doorstep of Beijing. So all of these factors makes for very complicated political situation, which is why even though things look rather bleak right now for U.S. imperialism, the situation could be reversible. But once again, if Washington policymakers were engaged in chess-like thinking, as opposed to checkers-like thinking, they would be looking at the future and contemplating the possibility that even if their most hopeful dreams about China come into play, the dislodging of the Communist Party, for example, which I must add quickly, I don’t see happening, but let’s say hypothetically that it does. Well, I think in order to effectuate that goal, it inevitably will empower the Tokyo-New Delhi duopoly, whose relations go back 2500 years to the founding of Buddhism, whose relations right now are still positive and will become ever more positive in light of the so-called Quad, where they’re being knocked together in this new anti-China alliance by Washington. And so that might emerge as the post-China champions, the post-China leaders, not necessarily U.S. imperialism. Just like by being obsessed with Moscow in the 1970s, the United States accomplished its goal to a certain degree in December 25th, 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed. But that only set the stage for the rise of China. So we might see another sort of cycle where Washington emerges disappointed and with Asian nations once again leading the pack.

Paul Jay

Well I’m hoping, searching for some kind of rationality in all this, but if the 20th and 21st century have anything to teach us, this system gets increasingly irrational. Thanks for joining us, Gerald.

Gerald Horne

Thank you.

Paul Jay

Thank you for joining us on theAnalysis.news. Please don’t forget the donate button and all the rest. And if there’s any questions or comments, send them in and the next time I talk to Gerald I’ll pose some of your questions and comments to him.